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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT.E OF UTAH

VIVIAN MEIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant
-vs.-

I

Case
No. 9855

MERRILL SOREN CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-Respondent

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injury arising out of an
intersection collision between the Plaintiff driving an automobile owned by her father and the Defendant driving a
truck owned by the Sevier School District.
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a v,erdict and judgment for the Defendant, Plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment of the Lower
Court and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arose out of an intersection collision which
occurred on the 19th day of November, 1960 at a point
where First South Street and Second East Street intersect
in Richfield, S,evier County, Utah. Vivian Meier, Plaintiff,
was driving an automobile north on Second East Street and
had proceeded into the intersection when the automobile
she was driving was struck by a vehicle being driven by
Merrill Soren Christensen. Vivian Meier suffered serious
injuries as a result of the collision, and an a c t i on was
brougtht to recover for the injuries she had suffered and
resulting expens,es which have been incurred by reason of
the accident.
The matter was tried before the Honorable Ferdinand
Erickson, District Judge sitting with a jury on the 23rd and
24th days of January, 1963. The jury returned a verdict
of no cause of action, and from this verdict and the judgment thereon the Plaintiff now appeals.
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL
1. The District Judge erred in commenting on
Plaintiff's evidence and extensively examining a
witness called by Plaintiff, which acts of the Court
were highly prejudicial.

2
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2. The Court erred in failing to accurately instruct the
jury as to the question of contributory negligence, if any,
on the part of the Plaintiff, and further failed to accurately
instruct as to the question of the Plaintiff's contributory
negligence, if any, being a proximate cause of her injuries.
ARGUMENT
The District Judge erred in commenting
on Plaintiff's ,evidence and extensively examining a
witness called by Plaintiff, which acts of the Court
were highly prejudicial.

Point 1.

It is realized a trial judge in a jury case has a difficult
task before him. He must have latitude in the conduct of
a trial in order to meet the various circumstances and situations which arise during the course of the trial. However,
a District Judge must conduct a trial in such a manner that
it will not prejudice the rights of the parties, especially
should he r,efrain from any remark which would in any way
influence the jury. 1

A trial judge has power within proper limits to examine witnesses for the purpose of ,eleciting material facts.
The limits of this examination, however, do not permit an
extensive ,examination which would u n d u 1 y impress the
jurors with the judge's opinion of the testimony or of the
witness testifying. 2 Such conduct on the part of a judge
invades the province of a trial jury which is empaneled and
sworn to try and determine by their verdict questions of
fact. 3 Appellate Courts have unanimously held any action
by a District Judge which reflects on the testimony of a
witness and which gives testimony an undue prominence by
53 Am Jur Trials Sec. 76
Aero Enterprises vs. Walker 228 P2D 811, 123 Colo. 113
3 78-46-4, UCA 1953
I

2

3
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either minimizing or exaggerating its value constitutes reversable error.!
It has been uniformly held that conduct of a judge trying

a case must b,e such that it will be fair to both sides. A departure from this fundamental requirement has been held
to be reversable error. 2 Prejudicial ,error has been held to
be committed if a judge's comments and remarks to a witness indicate that the Court had prejudged the case, or that
he thinks the witness is not telling the truth, or that his
statements are inaccurate. 3 It has further been uniformly
held that comments on the evidence which go to the weight
and sufficiency thereof are prejudicial error and invade the
province of the jury.4
Keeping in mind the foregoing holding, we quote from
the transcript of evidence to demonstrate the ,error committed by the District Judge and the highly prejudicial eff~ct
it had on the Plaintiff's case. As we briefly stated, this
action arose out of an inters.ection collision between an automobile being driven by the Plaintiff and an automobile being driven by the Defendant. The most crucial issue of fact
for the jury to find was the exact point of impact. To establish the point of impact the Plaintiff called a police offi~r
who investigated the accident. The officer's testimony was
offered to assist the jury in locating the exact point of impact and further, to demonstrate the Plaintiff's favored
position in the intersection. Her position was that of being
on the r i g h t at the time of entering the intersection,
(R 131) and also that of entering the intersection first.
(Plaintiff's exhibit 1; R 75, L 18-24; R 92, L 16-29).
See
Am
3 Am
4 Am
1

2

Annotation 127 ALR 1389
Jur Appeal & Error 1052
Jur 1052 -Appeal & Error 1053 & 1054
Jur Appeal & Error - 1055
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Leslie Jensen, Richfield City Chief of Police, testified
at some length concerning the investigation he made at the
scene of the accident. (R 119 through 181).
The officer testified that he was able to identify the
point of impact by locating the debris in the intersection.
The debris consisted of glass, dirt, mud, and other material
which had fallen from the cars. He stated he was able to
cross check the point of impact and to establish it definitely
by identifying scuff marks left by each of the four wheels
of each of the automobiles. (R 135; R 136; R 138, L 19
through 30; R fl39, L 1 through 18; R 142, L 12 through 19;
R 178; R 179; and R 180). The officer stated that as the
cars came together each of the cars was forced to s I i d e
sideways, and though there were no brake marks left by
either car, he was able to establish a marking from each of
the four wheels of each automobile by the scuff marks left
at the time of impact. He said that he took a piece of chalk
and chalked each of the four wheels on each automobile and
by cross checking the position of the wheels at the time of
impact with the pile of debris, he was able to ~establish an
exact point of impact. The point of impact the officer
established showed the front of the Plaintiff's automobile
was nearly through the intersection.
The District Judge took exception to the officer's statement that a point of impact could be established with certainty. (R 138, L 14 through 18; R 154, L 2 through 11).
The Court proceeded to make such an examination of the
witness as to indicate to the jurors the officer's statements
were open to serious question and that they were inaccurate. The Court also made comments in which he stated
positively that a point of impact could not be established
with certainty.
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The emphasis added by underscoring certain portions
of the statements and questions of the Court have b e ~ n
added by us and were not a part of the Court Reporter's
transcript.
Commencing at Page 137 of the record, line 21, the
Court states as follows:
THE COURT: Now, of cours,e, that contemplates a
factor on two moving objects, for example, two moving objects and we must assume, of course, both
were moving at the time.
MR. OLSEN: That's right.
THE COURT: And they collide or meet. We have
every right to believe under natural law that the
position of those vehicles is going to be altered somewhat from their direction or course. At the first
moment, for example that thes,e vehicles are moving
they are not going to come to a direct stop. I think
we have a right to assume that. Would that debris,
which he finds, the glass or, I think he mentioned
theWITNESS: The mud or dirt or whatever you call it.
THE COURT: The mud or dirt or whatever happens to fall, would that-this debris-with the vehicle still moving, would that debris be where the
impact came or would it be scattered along some
distance?
MR. OLSEN: I would be glad to have you ask that
question of the officer if you would like to, the way
they cross check on that problem. I think it might
be well for the jury to understand that.
THE COURT: The only r.eason I ask that is that in
the Court's judgment it is rather difficult to say
just wbe~e· these two automobiles or two moving
obj,ects came together, both moving. If one were
stationary, for example, whyThe foregoing questions and comments focused t h e
jury's attention on the importance of the problem and also
suggested the Court's opinion on the question of fact pre6
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sented. With this background, the examination and comments which followed were disastrous to the Plaintiff's case.
Continuing at page 139, line 21 of the record:
THE COURT: Well, of course, it somewhat answers
the question that was in the Court's mind. The only
thoug.ht the court had, of course, was whether or not
these visible things on the highway, the things he
m~entioned, the dirt, the glass, the debris, was proper
1evidence of the position of the cars at the time of
impact. If a vehicle is traveling north on Second
East, at that intersection, another vehicle is traveling East on First South and the two meet, the car
traveling north-it would seem the car trav,eling
north, the Oldsmobile was hit somewhere near the
front door, would that not have a tendency to push
that car farther ,east?
WITNESS : It would.
THE COURT: Now when would those marks, the
tire marks become visible-immediately or would
they extend over a little period of time?
A. They scraped the dust that's on the road. You
know there is a coat of dust that's on there and it
scrapes down ther,e to the oil. It takes the dust off
and leaves a black mark- tire prints.
Q. Could those marks be left immediately at the
time of impact?

A.

Yes.

Q.

At the time thes,e forces apply?

A.

It would.

MR. OLSEN:
Your Honor?

Do you have any further questions,

BY THE COURT: What kind of marks do you refer
to? What kind of marks would be left on the highway? I mean by the tires.
WITNESS: By the tires, they are generally kind
of wide and sometimes they are narrow and mayb,e
they will go quite a little ways, length ways, like
they will be the width of the tires that is on the oil.
THE COURT: Would it always follow that where
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

two vehicles meet as these two vehicles did, there
would be some tir,e marks?
A. Most of the time.
Q. BY THE COURT: Could not one car, for example, move without any appreciable evidence of a
tire mark?
A. Well, generally when ther,e is an impact like
that, both cars leave a mark.
THE COURT: Now, may I ask you, what mark
would the car traveling east, like the pick-up truck
in this case, would there be any evidence ?
WITNESS : There would be a small piece f r o m
either side, whichever way it went to, there would
be some marks.
THE COURT: Now you got on the car that is traveling east, you've got a wheel running in the course
or dir,ection it's traveling on?
WITNESS:

Yes.

THE COURT: Would that wheel tend to show a
greater mark on the surface of the highway, than a
wheel that is being slipped along?
WITNESS: Well, no, the car that's sliding along
will make the widest mark.
THE COURT: And what marks did you observe so
far as the vehicle traveling ,east on First South, that
would be the pick-up truck?
A. Well, it had marks so you could tell where it
slid on the oil.
THE COURT: Did you identify those marks and
measure them?
A. Well, I just measured from there to the pile of
debris that was laying in the middle of the road at
the intersection.
THE COURT: That's all I have.
Q. The tire marks you are talking about are they
brake marks or scuff marks from a car knocked
sideways?
A. Well, if they've got their brakes on or if they
let it go, it will make marks anyway, with the brakes
on or off.

8
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In order to demonstrate to the jury the officer's measurements and their significance, a plat was prepared for the
Plaintiff by a registered land survyor. The plat was admitted into evidence upon stipulation of counsel as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1. It show,ed the intersection drafted to scale and
also showed each of the permanent markers used by the
officer to fix the point of impact. The officer first located
the point of impact by the method we have described, and
then measured from the point of impact to permanent
markers at or near the inter section. (R 142, L 23, R 143,
L 15 through 24). The officer stated the point of impact
could b,e re-established by measuring back from the monuments. It is clearly seen the point of impact could be reestablished by measuring back from the permanent markers the same distance as was shown in the officer's report
and then by making arcs after each measurement. The arcs
would cross in the street at one point, which point would be
the point of impact.
The District Judge continued to undermine the testimony of the officer and to indicate the methods he had used
to gather his evidence and the manner in which he had
made measurements weren't accurate and were subj,ect to
challenge. The examination continued (R 152, L 15) :
THE COURT: Let me say that I think it is probably confusing. After all the only way to determine, it seems to me, the point of impact, is take
that area for example, which is legally described as
the intersection, from the sidewalk on the north
border,ed by the sidewalk on the west by the sidewalk on the south, by the sidewalk on the east. Now
that area comprises your intersection.
MR. OLSEN: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now, ther,e is a confined, limited
area. Now if per chance an accident happens within that area, we know if, for example, a car is traveling east into that intersection, he has got to be for

9
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example on the south side of that highway, hasn't
he? And we know if a vehicle is traveling, for example, north on that or into that sam.e intersection,
it in turn must be on the east side of that highway.
Now it appears to me that the only safe way to determine the point of impact, if it can be done, and
if you can do that, is all these other factors, but assuming that you can go up there and see some debris
and say, "Well, that must be it." That's about what
we're doing. It seems to me that the measurements
should be made within the intersection and not, for
example, from a telephone pole out here to a certain
point or from somewhere else. Now, I don't know
why we've got a difference of distance between 35
and 32 feet. What's the significance of that thirtyfive feet?
The examination continued further (R 155, L 5):
THE COURT: Of course, I'm aware of that, the only
thing what w,e are trying to do here, Tex, with the
aid of this jury and this court, is to fix, as near as
we can fix, what someone said or where someone
said the impact came, the officer who inv,estigated.
MR. OLSEN: That's right.
THE COURT: Now he's got to have a square here,
as I say bounded by sidewalks and corners. Now
he has got to determine, for example, where that
impact is before he can start measuring from the
telephone pole out to some particular point.
MR. OLSEN: That's right.
THE COURT: And from some flume to some other
point, so the essential thing is the point which this
witness testified, which may or may not be. It's his
judgment that this probably was wher,e it happened, so it appears to me that instead of running lines
from given point, the ressential thing, the thing he
had to do is find out where those cars collided in his
judgment.
MR. OLSEN: That's just exactly what he's talking
about.
THE COURT: Now if he could draw a square I
think he could do that just as easily as anybody
else--

10
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MR. OLSEN: And he'sTHE COURT: And fix, for example, the center of
that square in relation to the accident to the center
of the square.
Continuing R 156, L 25:
THE COURT: Let me ask the witness one question:
What was the purpose of making this measurem·ent? That would be from looking north now, from
the west end of the culvert, running in a northeasterly direction thirty-fiv:e feet?
WITNESS: Well, you try to take-you've got three
or four points you measure from, so you will have
something to go by.
THE COURT: From thes:e points you measure from
the known- you call it a monument-from this culvert here, you measure up how far? Y o u w e n t
thirty-five feet. Why thirty-five feet?
WITNESS: Well, that's the center of the impact.
THE COURT: Well, that would be in this quadrant
here, would it not? These two lines indicate the
center-that would be the center, I assume, of the
intersection?
WITNESS:
ing.)

Yes, right in this area here (indicat-

THE COURT: Well, this line-that's why I want
to know why this thirty-five foot measure?
WITNESS: Well, you got to have your measurements or you can just have one. But it is hetter to
have two or three measurements, if one or the others a!ie to be moved, like a telephone pole, they come
and move it or they move a culvert out.
THE COURT: Of course, you could take m.easurements, for example, and you could literally locat·e
that accident in any quadrant, .if you are just going
to just tak.e a measurement, that's my point.
The Court not only commented on the method of locating the point of impact, but inaccurately informed the witness and the jury that by using the investigation methods
11
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of the witness the accident could b:e located in any quadrant
of the intersection. (R 157, L 20). This was not only a
prejudicial comment, but was an inaccurate assumption of
the Court.
The Court then continued: (R 157, L 27)
THE COURT: I want him to testify where in his
judgment this accident happened. In what particular quadrant, and I t~ink that is som,ething the jury
should know on this thing.
It is apparent the for,egoing question indicated to the
jury that the Court did not believe the testimony which had
already been given by the witness and the Court was going
to require the witness to give information to the jury which
would have some value to them.
Continuing (R 158, L 14 through 19) :
THE COURT: Well, it is in his judgment, that's
where he belived it was, just a little north of the
center line.
A. Just a little over the center line.
THE COURT: I doubt that we can illuminate the
matter much. We have got rather confused, I know.
The last comment of the Court indicated to the jury
the officer was very confused in his testimony and it was
impossible to go farther with the witness to illuminate the
matter or to identify the point of impact. This assumption
was contrary to fact since it appears from an examination
of the officer's testimony that he was v;ery specific as to the
point of impact. However, even if the comments of the
Court welie factual the judge would not have had the privilege of invading the province of the jury and commenting
upon questions of fact and thereby emphasizing his opinions
ther1eon.
The damaging remarks of the Court concerning the unreliability of the officer's testimony and the impossibility
12
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of establishing a d,efinite point of impact would be sufficient
to prejudice a jury and cause the jury to discount or disregard the officer's testimony. This prejudice together with
the instructions given by the Court, would leave the jury
no alternative but to return a verdict against the Plaintiff,
as was done.
Point 2. The Court erred in failing to accurately instruct the jury as to the question of contributory
negligence, if any, on the part of the Plaintiff, and
further failed to accurately instruct as to the question of the Plaintiff's contributory negligence, if
any, being a proximate cause of her injuries.
The Plaintiff entered the intersection in which the collision occurred from the right, and the only logical conclusion which can be reached is the Plaintiff was also first in
the intersection. (Plaintiff's exhibit 1; R 75, L 78-24; R 92,
L 16-29).
Under these circumstances Plaintiff was entitled to instructions to the jury concerning her favored position in
the intersection. By reason of Section 41-6-72, UCA, 1953,
and also by reason of a local extension of the statute adopted by Richfield City under Richfield City Ordinances, 1953,
Section 308, it is specifically provided a driver of a motor
vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of
way to a vehicle approaching the intersection f r o m t h e
right. It is also provided a driver shall yield to the vehicle
first entering the intersection.
The statute and ordinan~e provide definite rules for
intersections in order to make movements of traffic both
practical and safe. The rules established reiterate general
traffic rules adopted throughout the United States a n d
cited in 2 Blashfield Cyclopedia of American Law and Prac13
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tice, permanent edition, Sections 991 to 994. The general
rule commented upon is that the vehicle entering the crossing first has the right of way over the second vehicle coming from another direction, unless under the standard of
du;e care, the driver should not proceed because to do so
would hazard a collision. In the present case, even if there
is doubt as to which automobile entered the intersection
first, the rule concerning the driver approaching from the
right applies and gives the Plaintiff the right of way. The
Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to an instruction which
clearly showed the jury the Plaintiff had the right to r,ely
on her favored position.
In the well reasoned case of Martin vs. Stevens (121
Utah, 848, 243 P2D, 747) the following language was used:
"Although Plaintiff had the right of way under both
rules above r,eferred to, yet there developed upon
him the duty of due care in observing the other traffic. But in doing so, he had the right to assume,
and to rely and act on the assumption that others
would do likewise; he was not obligated to anticipate
either the other drivers would drive negligently, nor
fail to accord him his right of way, until in the exercise of due care, he observed, or should have observed, something to warn him that the other driver was
driving negligently or would fail to accord him his
right of way. If this principle is not clear in the
earlier Utah cases, it is firmly -established by the
more recent expressions of this Court."
The Court also discussed the Utah case of Hess vs.
Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 PD2 510, where the Plaintiff
failed to see the Defendant's ambulance coming into the intersection from the w;est. It was held that even though
Plaintiff was negligent in not seeing the ambulance, the
question as to whether his negligence proximately contributed to the cause of his injury was properly submitted to the
jury. It was held the jury could find it to be within the
14
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driver's duty of due care to assume the driver of the other
vehicle would obey the stop sign, and that he was entitled
to proceed through the intersection until it became appar~
ent to him the ambulance would not stop.
In the cas:e of Lowder vs. Holley 120 Utah 231, 233
P2d 350, the Plaintiff failed to observe t h e Defendant's
vehicle approaching from the right. There was ~vidence
from which it could be found that at the time the Plaintiff
was about ready-to enter the intersection the Defendant
was 250 feet away. It was held the question of whether the
Plaintiff's failure to s:ee the defendant approach was negligence was a question of fact. It was also observed that had
the Plaintiff seen the Defendant it could be found to he
within his duty of due care to assume the Defendant would
yield him the right of way.
In accordance with the Utah holdings cited above the
Plaintiff submitted Plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 4 on
the question of negligence which reads as follows:
You ar,e instructed that if the Plaintiff, V i v i a n
Meier, was at the time of and immediately prior to
the time of the accident driving her automobile into
and across the intersection of First South and Second East Streets in a lawful and proper manner, she
had the right to assume and rely and act on the assumption that others would do likewise; she was not
obliged to anticipate either that other drivers would
drive negligently nor fail to accord her right of way
until in the exercise of due care she observed or
should have observed something to warn her that
the other driver was driving negilgently or would
fail to accord her the right of way.
The District Court erred in r,efusing Plaintiff's instruction, and as a substitute therefor minimized the Plaintiff's
position by giving instruction No. 10 (R 21) which states as
follows:
15
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When the law says that one person has the right of
way over another, it simply means that such person
has the immediate privilege of occupying the space
in question and other persons must yield to such
person.
The foregoing instruction appears to riequire that a
party actually possess or be in a particular s p a c e before
he has the privilege of claiming the right of way. The
term "immediate privilege of occupying" appears to require
that the party be in the particular space as though parked
in that space in order to have any prior claim or right which
would require the other party to yield. The instruction is
not broad enough to allow the party having the prior right
the privilege of continuing on and crossing the intersection.
Instruction No. 11 shown at page 22 of the Record
reads as follows:
The fact that one has the right of way, if such be
the fact, does not excuse him from the exercisie of
ordinary care to avoid causing an accident.
The two instructions cited above not only fail to explain
the favored position of the Plaintiff, but, in fact, negate it.
Under the rulings in Hess vs. Robinson supra; Lowder
vs. Holley supra; and Poulson vs. Manis, 241 P2D 152 121
Utah 269, the Plaintiff was also entitled to a specific instruction concerning proximate caus,e. Even if the jury concluded that the Plaintiff failed to keep a lookout to the east,
Plaintiff was entitled to an instruction which could permit
the jury to find that this failur,e, although negligence, may
not have proximately caused the collision. (See Plaintiff's
offered instruction No. 5 which was rejected.) The jury
was 1entitled to be instructed that the Plaintiff, within the
limits of reasonable care, could have assumed the Defendant would yield the right of way.
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The general instruction on proximate cause and negligence g i v e n by the Lower Court, instruction No. 15-A
(R 27), would mean nothing to the jury, and for this reason
was objected to by the Plaintiff.
The error complained of was compounded by instruction No. 18 found at page 33 of the Record which is as follows:
If you find from the evidence that Vivian M,eier

knew or should have known, under the circumstances, that the car driven by Merrill Soren Christensen
was not going to yield the right of way, then Vivian
Meier had a duty to use reasonable car,e to avoid a
collision; if you find she failed to do so, then she is
negligent.
Bullock vs. Luke 198 P2D 350.
The addition of the case citation for the jury drew
undue attention to the instruction and also set it apart and
thereby gave it more weight than the other instructions.
This instruction taken with instructions 10 and 11 s,eemed
to place the absolute obligation on Vivian Meier of knowing
the Defendant would fail to yield the right of way, and
further placed the obligation upon Vivian Meier of avoiding
the collision. The instruction was misleading in that it
placed the burden of avoiding the accident upon the Plaintiff who held the right of way. It was also ,erroneous in that
it failed to explain that even if Vivian Meier were found to
be negligent in failing to s,ee the Defendant, this negligence
may not have proximately caused the accident, as we have
already discussed. The instructions taken together appear
to inform the jury that the Plaintiff was negligent by reason of the fact she was involved in an intersection collision.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion w1e respectfully submit the acts of the
District Judge in commenting upon Plaintiff's evidence and
also in extensively examining one of Plaintiff's witnesses
wer~e highly prejudicial.
In connection with Point 2 involving the instructions
given by the District Court, we also respectfully submit the
instructions did not accurately instruct the jury concerning
the law of the State of Utah on intersection collisions. The
instructions, in fact, gave the Plaintiff an insurmountable
burden to overcome. In our opinion the instructions were
such that it would have been impossible for the jury to find
for the Plaintiff, since the instructions left the jury with
only one conclusion to reach, and that was that the Plaintiff
was negligent at the time of the collision, and for this reason, she could not recover.
For all of the reasons set forth, the Appellant requests
that the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the Lower
Court be rev~ersed and the matter be remanded for a new
trial.
Respectfully submitted.
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
Attorneys at Law
Richfield, Utah
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